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Where does the European polity end? This fundamental question has kept
generations of European thinkers busy. Defining who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ is indeed
a tricky issue. Next to a multitude of political, legal, and also cultural factors, context
matters a lot when (re)drawing European boundaries. The significant migratory
increase Europe experienced in 2015 propelled the protection of the EU’s external
borders to the top of the political agenda. Consequently, Frontex—the Union’s
agency in charge of external border control—experienced an important upgrade
in terms of competences and capabilities. The logic underpinning this move was
that more power and resources would help to improve the control and management
of the EU’s external borders in relation to migratory pressures, transboundary
criminality, and other security threats.
At the exploration of the EU’s Southern ‘pre-frontier
area’
But where exactly are these borders that Frontex is to protect? This question
brings us back to the initial interrogation on the confines of Europe. Intuitively, we
would say that Frontex operates at the EU’s external borders which, essentially,
are the sum of all EU Member States’ land and sea borders with third countries.
However, a closer look at the manifold activities of Frontex leads to a quite different
conclusion. Next to its presence at the borders with third countries, the agency
has progressively increased the number of extraterritorial activities far beyond the
European boundaries. Based on a combination of formal and informal agreements,
the agency has managed to project its control and intelligence activities to the EU’s
arc of neighbours and far beyond. Incrementally, the agency has conquered the so-
called pre-frontier area of the EU that, according to the relevant EU rules, covers all
non-EU land and sea territories.
Especially since the migratory pressure of 2015, the agency has discovered
the significance of the African pre-frontier area. The rationale behind this
reinforced engagement in Africa is one of pre-emptive border control and migration
management: By means of enhanced surveillance and capacity building, (potential)
problems are identified and addressed long before they hit the EU at its external
borders. This contribution sketches out the progressive Southern extension of the
theatre of operations of Frontex from the Mediterranean to the Sahel region, in
particular through intelligence activities. As demonstrated by two case studies—
the first concerning the cooperation of Frontex with the EU’s military operation in
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the Mediterranean Sea, and the second regarding its increased presence in Sub-
Saharan Africa—the African continent has become Frontex turf. This, in turn, raises
a number of questions.
A steady surveillance rapprochement: law
enforcement and military cooperation in the
Mediterranean
The Mediterranean Sea has for many years been the theatre of numerous Frontex-
led maritime operations, including Indalo, Poseidon, or Themis (formerly Triton) to
name only some. In recent years, the agency’s level of operational engagement
in the Mediterranean has noticeably intensified while taking a more pre-emptive
twist. Indicative of this development is the unprecedented close cooperation
between Frontex and EU security and defence actors, in particular the Union’s naval
operation EUNAVFOR Med Sophia. The unusual alliance between an agency of
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), on the one hand, and a military
operation deployed under the Common Security and Defence Policy of the Union
(CSDP), on the other, can be explained by a major common interest: intelligence
sharing.
Operation Sophia was set up in 2015 to fight human smuggling and trafficking along
the Central Mediterranean route. Since then, the Operation’s mandate has been
amended several times. In 2016, the implementation of the UN arms embargo on
the high seas off the Libyan coasts as well as the training of Libyan coast guards
was added to the Operation’s mandate. These new tasks significantly expanded the
intelligence portfolio of Operation Sophia: Indeed, surveillance activities, evidence
gathering, and the collection and storage of personal data amassed in the course
of the operation have been on the rise since 2016. Even when the deployment of
the Operation Sophia’s naval assets was suspended in early 2019 due to profound
disagreements of Member States on the role of the Operation, its intelligence
mandate remained unaltered.
Importantly, the collected data can be shared with competent Union bodies,
including Frontex. This means that the agency is entitled to receive data on migrants
(and smugglers), including their fingerprints, acquired by Operation Sophia while
carrying out its mandate. In return, Frontex inputs strategically important information
about the methods used by criminal groups that the agency’s mobile debriefing
team collects and processes. In the framework of Operation Sophia, Frontex also
got involved in the (severely criticised) training of Libyan coast guards on law
enforcement at sea. What is more, the agency touched base with the civilian side
of security and defence: Next to deploying a liaison officer to the civilian mission in
Libya (EUBAM Libya), the agency started to offer courses to Libyan coast guard
members together with that mission and Italian authorities.
In 2018, information sharing in the joint fight against human trafficking and smuggling
off the Libyan shore reached a new level with the establishment of the Crime
Information Cell (CIC). The rationale behind the Cell’s creation was to facilitate
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the receipt, collection, and transmission at the EU level of information between
involved military and policy actors. Praised as the first concrete example of a
CSDP–AFSJ cooperation, the pilot project brought together members of Operation
Sophia, officials from national law enforcement authorities, and representatives
from several EU agencies (i.e. Frontex, Europol, Eurojust, and EASO). The Cell
hosted by Operation Sophia thus provided for an intelligence interface combining
different sources of information that could then be used both for police and military
purposes. As borders have become more flexible, their management has become
more flexible, too, combining civilian and military instruments.
The entente between Frontex and Operation Sophia illustrates an underlying
conceptual and operational shift: Not only have the internal and external spheres of
EU security become imbricated, but information gathering and intelligence sharing
have come to be seen as a strategic priority of effective security governance and
border management.
Weaving a dense intelligence net: the case of Sub-
Saharan Africa
Intelligence gathering also drives the gradual extension of Frontex activities to
the African continent. Already in 2010, the Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community
(AFIC) was launched which, nowadays, counts 26 countries from all over the African
continent. A pivotal element of the AFIC are the so-called Risk Analysis Cells
that were set up in the aftermath of the migratory increase of 2015. Staffed with
local analysts trained by Frontex, these cells are to collect and analyse strategic
data on cross-border crime and support relevant authorities involved in border
management. The gathering and assessment of information on illegal border
crossings, document fraud, and trafficking in human beings forms explicitly part of
the intelligence gathering exercise. This, in turn, underlines that the AFIC’s raison
d’être is to advance the pre-frontier intelligence picture by the comprehensive
monitoring of migratory movements. The collected and processed data is shared
with all relevant authorities at the national and regional level and with Frontex.
And as for its European ‘pendant’ (the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk
Analysis Network), the input of the African Risk Analysis Cells feeds into regular
reports, the AFIC Joint Reports, that also contain policy recommendations.
So far, a handful of Risk Analysis Cells have been set up in Africa since 2018, both
in countries of origin and transit along the main migratory routes. The location of the
first Cell opened in Niamey (Niger) in 2018 is no coincidence: The Sahel region and
in particular Niger is known for being a transit hub for migrants on their way North
(mostly to Libya) to reach Europe on the Central Mediterranean route. Further Cells
were established in Gambia, Ghana, and Senegal. Thereby, intelligence can also
more easily be collected with respect to the Western Mediterranean route (running
through West Africa and Morocco to Spain) along which migratory movements have
risen steeply in the last years. With a view to enlarging the AFIC to an increased
number of countries, Kenya, Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria are planned to host further
Cells.
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Once all Risk Analysis Cells will be operational, Frontex will have access to a wide
and dense intelligence network, especially in West Africa and the Sahel and Lake
Chad regions. This pre-frontier intelligence, in turn, will enhance the possibility
for pre-emptive border control and extraterritorial migration management on the
African continent. Think, for instance, of a person stranding in Libya. So far, it is
often difficult to pin down the ‘country of origin’ of this person not least because of
lacking documentation. However, if Risk Analysis Cells spread over West Africa
and the Sahel region start to collect and share data of migrants, including their
fingerprints, this will allow to trace at least partly their migratory path and potentially
facilitate returns. For this strategy to work in the long run, though, checks in African
countries would need to be more frequent, and the data would need to be sufficiently
reliable. This, however, presupposes a considerable state building and development
aid effort. Interestingly enough, the creation of the Risk Analysis Cells is financed
by DG DEVCO, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International
Cooperation and Development.
It is furthermore worth mentioning that the new Frontex mandate of 2019 allows
for executive missions to be carried out in countries with no direct border with the
EU. The agency is even mandated to establish antenna offices on non-EU territory.
Future deployments of the agency to Africa to take action in countries of origin and
transit are thus no longer pure fiction.
Implications of the new confines of the EU
The intensified presence of Frontex in Africa is likely to trigger conflicts on the
division of labour between different EU structures. So far, Africa has constituted
a major operational turf of conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacebuilding
carried out under the Common Security and Defence Policy. Over the last two
decades, numerous civilian and military CSDP activities have been implemented in
a dozen African countries. The enlargement of the portfolio of Frontex to capacity
building and training of security sector actors in Africa sits uneasy with the previously
prevailing conceptual and geographical delimitations between different EU security
actors: CSDP actors took over the pre-frontier zone while law enforcement agencies
took care of Europe’s periphery and arc of neighbours. The EU judicature endorsed
this distinction between internally-oriented security activities (AFSJ domain) and
external security activities (CSDP turf) on several occasion (see here and here). Due
to the Africa move of Frontex, overlap increases in particular with civilian missions
that risk to be progressively marginalized by EU law enforcement agencies. As
the line between internal and external security has ceased to exist in practice, it is
high time that the EU properly streamlines its internal and external security arms—
including in Africa. Given the growing affinity of national leaders and European
decision-makers for law enforcement in security management, the recalibration of
EU security measures in Africa will most likely not be to the detriment of Frontex.
This, in turn, raises a fundamental issue as, in principle, more power comes with
more responsibility. Let us first have a look at the southwards expansion of pre-
frontier intelligence activities. The democratic credentials and human rights records
of many African governments are at best mixed. Given this fragile public governance
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context, it is judicious to define an appropriate and transparent accountability
and data protection scheme for extensive intelligence sharing with African law
enforcement and border control authorities. Key in this regard is also to clarify (and
codify) the interface between the African intelligence and the existing EU databases
related to migration monitoring, namely Eurodac, SIS, and VIS. This leads to a
second set of interrogations related to the liability of Frontex for potential human
rights violations occurring extraterritorially, especially when undertaking executive
missions. The African theatre of operations will constitute no exception in this regard
—to the contrary. If, in the future, Frontex was to address migratory movements
directly in countries of origin and transit, where legal protection standards are often
weak, the risk of human rights violations without appropriate redress routes would
increase by the mere intensification of situational exposure. So far, these crucial
legal issues have not been addressed.
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